Pilgrimage and philosophy - Children and Youth Philosophers

bweb

2007-09-26, 13:11 #1

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Subject: Pilgrimage and philosophy

I read your article about pilgrimage and philosophy and was honestly quite impressed. I very much liked how you combined theory and practice in such a fruitful way. I was wondering if you have ever read Piere Hadot. His second book on the understanding of philosophy in Ancient Greek is quite interesting and might strengthen your work in the direction of philosophy as transformation. Even with your link to pilgrimage. I was also thinking about this practice in Ancient Greek about walking and debating. There is also something called 'Walking Meditation'.

I like how you draw the line between religious experience and philosophy, but not including wonder from philosophy. I think both elements are core: the method of thinking and reasoning as well as this 'philosophical attitude of self transformation, wonder and even danger (which is quite an existential understanding of philosophy).

Oyvind (Administrator) 2007-09-26, 13:16 #2

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Hi bweb! I have not read the Hadot book, didn't even know about it. But judging from your description it seems I've simply got to read it. Thanks for the tip. What's the title of the book?

And you're right: to see philosophy as self transformation is indeed an existential way to understand philosophy. But I don't see a difference
between this understanding and an understanding that sees philosophy as thinking and reasoning. On the contrary: it is the reasoning that
initiates the (philosophical, not religious) transformation. Is this your point too, or do I misunderstand you?

Retention of strangeness is the only antidote to estrangement. T. W. Adorno

bweb

2007-09-26, 13:20 #3

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With regard to Hadot, I'm not quite so sure about the original title, but the German title of the book is: 'Wege zur Weisheit oder Was lehrt uns die Antike Philosophie'. His first book on this topic is: Philosophy as a way of life (original auch in franzoesisch). Although this first and older book much shorter and gives a quick overview the later one is much more academic. Also: Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique [https://www.opacplus.bsb-muenchen.de/InfoGuideClient/singleHit.do?methodToCall=showHit&curPos=15&identifier=-1_FT_147013091] might be a very good book for your current studies. Maybe you just see yourself what he has written and find out what suits the most. Though the two I read were particularly relevant to what you write about.

With regard to your other question: Yes, I totally agree. It is not either reasoning or existential discussion, but the one supports the other. Yet, it seems to me that reasoning alone as a method of technique which you can learn, doesn't necessarily lead to existential inquiry, whereas existential inquiry sometimes happens even without knowing reasoning techniques/knowledge. Lipman once said that there were two extremes of a good philosophical inquiry: the one is the highly abstract and logically refined and the other is the utterly personally profound. As philosophical inquirers we know both and sometimes they appear together.

Oyvind (Administrator) 2007-09-26, 13:28 #4

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Quote by bweb:
With regard to your other question: Yes, I totally agree. It is not either reasoning or existential discussion, but the one supports the other. Yet, it seems to me that reasoning alone as a method of technique which you can learn, doesn't necessarily lead to existential inquiry, whereas existential inquiry sometimes happens even without knowing reasoning techniques/knowledge. Lipman once said that there were two extremes of a good philosophical inquiry: the one is the highly abstract and logically refined and the other is the utterly personally profound. As philosophical inquirers we know both and sometimes they appear together.

I beg to differ. My experience is exactly that "reasoning alone" is capable of creating the most fundamental and existential movement in subjects - although such a movement is never planned for or talked about in the conversation. In my paper I do not go into detail about this point, but I think I give some indications that the "not so magic" reason has power to transform especially those people that are more used to listen to their feelings than to their reason. Simple logic is sometimes all it takes to bring them out of their all-too-familiar narratives and self-deceptions. For instance, the refusal to accept preliminary inconsistencies and contradictions in people's speech - also not accepting their usual claim that the inconsistencies will be cleared up later on in the speech - is sometimes enough to make them realise that what they are actually trying to express is based on faulty premises and unclear thought, i.e. they realise that they were deceived by themselves, and such a realisation is, in my book, nothing short of an existential experience or movement. Revealing what was previously hidden is the paradigmatic work of truth (cf. Heidegger's interpretation of "aletheia").

I suspect what Lipman is /really/ talking about here is on the one hand a careful, scientifically water-proof - and completely impersonal - debate among university peers, on the other hand a common "heart-to-heart" type of conversation where you can discover new things about yourself. This, however, seems to me a typical elitist split: either you follow the rules of science and logic, abstain from muddling the waters with personal and intimate issues and remain pure, /or/ you give a toss about formal rules in order to get direct access to "what really matters": the juicy stuff, philosophy on a personal level. I don't think such a split is very fruitful. Abstract thought - it need not be very refined or terminologically sophisticated, just basic logic: the principle of contradiction etc. - /is/ personal, viz. has consequences on a personal level. We just need (a Socrates) to discover it.

Retention of strangeness is the only antidote to estrangement. T. W. Adorno

bweb

2007-09-26, 13:32 #5

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What you said about dialogue and philosophy really made me think. I'm not sure if I would agree that this is all I see in philosophy, but certainly seems to be a part that I didn't pay enough attention too - obviously. I do understand better know, what you mean by touching and transforming existential beliefs and convictions by becoming aware of how they contradict one another or implying false premisis. I can also see much clearer the use of this technique. Thought I would still see it merely as a thinking technique. Do I understand you correctly here?

Though, if we think the other way around: many great philosophers weren't always coherent in a strict way. Was it Emerson who said?: 'Do I contradict myself? So what!'. I think for him coherency was not a core element of philosophy or insight. As one of the trancendentalists he was more coming from 'deepening of experience', 'awareness' and alike. Also, Derrida and many of the postmodernists, as you know, see the occidental rationalism as culturally dependent and showed how other cultures think e.g. in analogies and alike in which 'contradiction' is not a problem.

I would like to see 'thinking tools' as one important aspect. And I'm VERY grateful for pointing out again for me the existential impact of this tool, which was opaque for me before. I will also have a closer look on this part when I'll try out your exercises and will tell you about what I saw.

I believe when Lipman talks about the utterly profound than maybe he distinguishes between the rather private examples from daily life and then other experiences that we share with others that transcend the rather private sensation and remind us of the utterly profound that is transpersonal. Maybe I do see religious experience and philosophy very close ... maybe too close, you might criticize ;-)

Anyway, it is a joy to debate with you!

Oyvind (Administrator) 2007-09-26, 13:39 #6

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Quote by bweb:
What you said about dialogue and philosophy really made me think. I'm not sure if I would agree that this is all I see in philosophy, but certainly seems to be a part that I didn't pay enough attention too - obviously. I do understand better know, what you mean by touching and transforming existential beliefs and convictions by becoming aware of how they contradict one another or implying false premises. I can also see much clearer the use of this technique. Thought I would still see it merely as a thinking technique. Do I understand you correctly here?

Well, I guess you could put it like this: a rigourous thinking technique helps us reveal deficiencies in our thinking modes, a revelation that in turn may help us become more aware and conscious of ourselves as human beings. Of course, there is more to philosophy than this, but I think this is a very important, if not the most important aspect of practical philosophy, an aspect often neglected and underestimated, often reduced to mere technicality ("thinking technique"), i.e. to spiritless instruction or didactics.

Quote by bweb:
Though, if we think the other way around: many great philosophers weren't always coherent in a strict way. Was it Emerson who said?: 'Do I contradict myself? So what!'. I think for him coherency was not a core element of philosophy or insight. As one of the trancendentalists he was more coming from 'deepening of experience', 'awareness' and alike. Also, Derrida and many of the postmodernists, as you know, see the occidental rationalism as culturally dependent and showed how other cultures think e.g. in analogies and alike in which 'contradiction' is not a problem.

Now, this is an interesting objection: rationality as cultural prejudice, logic as the annihilator of deep experience and spiritual awareness. Also it answers beautifully your previous hesitation that philosophy must be more than "this". And, as I said, I agree: it must; and it is. But then I would hasten to add with Emerson: so what! From the fact that music is so very much more than Czerny's piano etudes it does not follow that these pieces are not music, neither that they are devoid of musical qualities, nor that they cannot open the mind of the musician and further her development as a human being, technically and spiritually. In the same vein, from the fact that philosophy is much more than being able to identify contradictions in your own speech it does not follow that such identification is worthless for the person, nor that the person is entirely unaffected by her discovery. And even if we should admit that Czerny's etudes and the discovery of a simple contradiction constitute less edifying experiences than, say, Chopin's etudes and the consumption of a book by Derrida respectively, it is appropriate to point out that we all have to start somewhere; like we say in Norway: we all have to learn to crawl before we can learn to walk. And how can we learn to appreciate and understand the most complex aesthetical and philosophical products of our culture if we have never learned to exercise stringency and tidiness in the appreciation and understanding of our own thoughts?

So, I think that rationality and logic need not be the annihilators of deep experience and spiritual awareness. I say "need not" because any method or tool or procedure may obviously be used inappropriately. One may for instance use logic for the single purpose of making people look stupid. On the other hand, I guess one can also misuse more psychologically-inspired philosophical approaches to exactly the same effect. So, the fact that logic may be misused (including: used as a mere tool for training specific mental skills) does not prove that it is useless in getting people to really know themselves better.

Quote by bweb:
I believe when Lipman talks about the utterly profound than maybe he distinguishes between the rather private examples from daily life and then other experiences that we share with others that transcend the rather private sensation and remind us of the utterly profound that is transpersonal.

Yes, maybe you're right. He is not quite making the kind of split I suggested; rather he's talking about two equally valuable kinds of philosophical practice: one that is logically and scientifically refined, and one that is transpersonally and psychologically profound. Still, could we not say that the first is primarily based on rationality (logic) and that the second is primarily based on feelings (what really is deep-felt)? Anyway, as far as I am concerned it doesn't matter what kind of practice you're involved in, as long as it makes you think, i.e. as long as it actively purports to contradict your most basic, most unproblematised assumptions...

Quote by bweb:
Maybe I do see religious experience and philosophy very close ... maybe too close, you might criticize

I would never dream of criticising you! I might, however, venture to express one or two footnotes to your thoughts. ;-)

Quote by bweb:
Anyway, it is a joy to debate with you!

And thank you for taking part in the debate (note that I am - according to my own words - willing to "thank you" but apparently not willing to "criticise you"; hm, there is a discrepancy hidden here!). ;-)

You have made me think...

Retention of strangeness is the only antidote to estrangement. T. W. Adorno

This post was edited on 2007-09-26, 15:10 by Oyvind.

bweb

2007-09-26, 13:41 #7

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I do see, and as I've said before, understand your point to see in 'thinking tools' more than tools, but a certain (almost artistic) skill that has developed as part of our culture. A way of thinking deeply and precisely and by doing so (often) gaining existential insight. I do like this aspect a lot. Although, and as you pointed out quite nicely, within the perspective of seeing it as a cultural development.

Another aspect though occurs to me here and might lead to reconstructing our idea of what rationality is: Habermas studied with Adorno and Horkheimer who were rather critical about the occidental rationality. Yet, Habermas in his book 'Theorie kommunikativen Handelns' pointed out that there are indeed more 'forms of rationality' and forms of dialogues. He therefore says that the reason why Adorno saw rationality so critical was because he only saw the 'instrumental aspect of reason' (I'm very uncertain about the right translation here), whereas what he sees as transcultural is 'communicative rationality. Communicative rationality can occur in an ideal speech situation where there is no hierarchy and all members of the dialogue have illocutative aims (they don't have a hidden goal that they not tell others, but the goal of the dialogue is to come to an understanding about what 'is' and the try to act in common).

Of course, there is much, much more to is. This is a very superficial and short summery of the 1600 pages ;-)

Nonetheless, I think it does help of thinking about different forms of rationality. In this case, rationality is also the skill to express myself and my thoughts as precise and honest as possible. I also listen and really try to understand what the other has in mind and how this is different from how I see the world. We also help together in becoming aware of unclarities and contradictions without getting mad, because our common goal is to come to an understanding and consens. Interestingly, this comes very, very close to the notion of c of i. So far I think nobody has worked out the relation between Habermas and p4c. Yet, since Habermas really comes up with very practical aspects on the one hand and, on the other hand, relates this idea beautifully to Kant's kategorial imperative, which he widens by the aspect of actually talking to the other (in Kant's world the dialogue was within me and I only anticipated the other, but would not really talk to the other).

Habermas also relates all this to Max Weber, Durkheim etc. ... again, I only touch the surface here.

And still we may ask: even when I include the other in this dialogue, is this kind of rationality universal? What is if the other thinks completely differently and doesn't think in terms of 'either ... or', identical/not identical, but as Foucault points out in analogies and similarities ...

Here I turn in a circle and maybe you can help.

One last thing though: I do not think at all that there is a contradiction between empathy/emotion and rationality (esp. if we understand it like Habermas does). I'm about to write a book on that and the more I think of it the clearer this part becomes. Yet, I'd be happy to hear your opinion or experiences about that.

Oyvind (Administrator) 2007-09-26, 22:06 #8

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Great post! First you present the highly relevant idea of multiple forms of rationality—thereby avoiding the necessity to go by only one (instrumental, logical) type of rationality in the realm of dialogue. Then you connect one of these forms, the habermasian "communicative rationality", with the "community of enquiry" which descends from the teachings of Pierce and Dewey—a connection which seems appropriate. Then you suggest that even a "communicative rationality" may not be intersubjective enough because it utilises basic logical operators which, according to Foucault, should not be taken for granted.

Well, I am definitely not the right person to deal with these grand issues from the inside but maybe I can make a comment from the outside? First it strikes me that the whole idea of multiple forms of rationality seems very much to be related to the idea of multiple forms of intelligence. For instance, if it is true that human intelligence can be separated into linguistic, logical, visual, kinaesthetic, musical, interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligences (cf. Howard Gardner: Frames of Mind: a Theory of Multiple Intelligence), then it seems unnatural to have but one form of rationality (assuming that we cannot really be intelligent without also being rational). However, I guess most people would say that rationality is a narrower concept than intelligence, so, even though you are socially (interpersonally) intelligent you need not act in a rational way. I find such language difficult to understand. In my view, if one is intelligent, one is also rational, no matter what "type" of intelligence one is dealing with. And if that assumption is correct, it seems plausible that we could have multiple forms of rationality as well.

In a wider sense the idea of multiple forms of rationality appears in our time because one now tends to regard intelligence as a power of the brain, not, like before, as the power of the brain. The old-fashioned type of intelligence, understood as powers of logical deduction (including the capacity to distinguish clearly between either/or, identity/not identity, one/many etc.), seems to have suffered exactly the same fate as the Morally Good, the One Truth and the Supreme Beauty: they have all become dethroned, fragmented and scattered. We are left with a foggy view consisting of "analogies and similarities" (Foucault), not being able any more to tell sharply one thing from another. We are stranded "in the night in which all cows are black" (Hegel: Phänomenologie des Geistes).

And what do we do in this night? We talk. We tell each other lovely stories. We try to communicate and comfort each other. Some try in desperation to count the black cows while others argue that it is in vain. Generally we speak softly and gently to each other as if still in shock after the terrible disaster where we lost sight of the sun, a disaster that no one really remembers any more, but that still lingers in the collective unconscious. It soon becomes apparent that we need a new basis on which to build a new form of society. And what could be more appropriate—when day has turned into perpetual night, when the pyramid has been turned upside-down resulting in a constant fear for it's collapse, when one no longer honours the merits and achievements of the few but instead the plain desires of the many—than to build the new society on a new type of consciousness that is alien to the terrible disaster, that knows no fear, that magically turns darkness into light and that will forever be alien to all disasters as long as we manage to keep it unchanged—the consciousness of the child?

Sorry, this is getting off topic. What I try to say—I think—is simply that we need a firm fundament for our thinking. If not, we lose track of reality and become nostalgic. :-)

Retention of strangeness is the only antidote to estrangement. T. W. Adorno

bweb

2007-10-03, 15:41 #9

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Dear Oyvind,
I'm very sorry that I reply so late, but there were a million things to do coming back from Canada and only now I finally have some time. Though I did think a lot about your answer. I liked a lot how visually/sensually you describe the paradox and difficulty of our post-metaphysic situation. We struggle desprately to find something to hold on. And there is indeed not much left. Even rationality slips out of our hands.
I think Habermas is addressing exactly this problem. But instead of Kant's idea to 'keep the other in our own mind', Habermas trys to invite the other to a dialogue. The deliberation of what 'is', or how we interpret the world, is based on an ongoing process. This process trys to prevent maginalizations, because hidden things come continously into the light.
Habermas' understanding of rationality comes - in my eyes - very close to Gadamer: we genuinly try to understand each other and in this process we try to be as clear as possible, because our aim is to find consensus and agree on an interpretation on the world. We may agree because of different reasons, but it is necessary that we are willing to engage in dialogue and listen. There is of course a huge portion of idealism included in this view!
Although I find your association about various types of intelligence very interesting and would like to think a little more about how that plays a role here, I'm not sure if Habermas is thinking about various types of rationality as various types of intelligence ... on the other hand, I intuite a relation here ... Thank you for making this connection ... maybe you can think it a little further yourself and tell my your thoughts?

I also liked you image about light and dark. I've always wanted to start a movement opposite to the 'enlightenment', which would be called the 'endarkenment' ;-)

I would probably start with Levinas here and go into the notion of Otherness, this might also be the task of poetry: to veil the idea in order to make it visible (I wrote an article on that and Merleau-Ponty a long time ago), now I have to think of that again.

In postmodern times truth, beauty, good, becomes subjective. The responsibility is on us. And yet I refuse to see our situation as completely open. Since we can't really rely on reason or absolute truth, maybe other aspects come into the foreground. Rorty believes that this is 'empathy'. .... Though we are hesitant to suddenly see - something as vague as 'emotions' - as the last fundament ... Are we at the beginning again?

Please forgive my spelling mistakes ... I need to run now ... I hope my thoughts make some sense.

Very warmly,
Barbara

Oyvind (Administrator) 2007-10-09, 00:04 #10

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Hi Barbara! Thanks again for your reply!

First I would like to expand a little on the final point I was making in my last post. I think that our post-metaphysic predicament is one of the main reasons why we turn to the child to such a degree that we do today. By "turning to the child" I think of how we today, more or less secretly, adore and admire childhood: it's innocence and spontaneity, it's eagerness and desire to know, it's intrepid questioning, it's unhindered joy and contagious merriment. Also we admire or even envy children their youth, having the better part of their lives ahead of them—contrary to adults to whom the physical decay is only too apparent and for whom the countdown to nothingness is an ever growing object of despair. We turn to childhood because we have nowhere else to turn after the great metaphysical break-down. No other phase of life, no life-utterance, no intellectual achievement, no single human aspiration comes as close to the lost realm of God as the "divinity" of the child. It's pure magic! That's why the 20th century is said to be the century of the child. And that's why, I think, we are less and less prone to accept the claim of religion: we have already found our substitute.

Well, be that as it may. Regarding the issue of intelligence: my idea was simply that here we have rather conspicuous examples of divisions of central human faculties (rationality and intelligence). Before, rationality and intelligence were one, now they have both been split into multiple instances of themselves. Moreover I suggested that we can trace the need for these divisions to one event, namely the aforementioned "disaster" (the fall of the true and the good). Whether there is a closer connection between the splitting of intelligence into several types of intelligence on the one hand, and the splitting of rationality into several kinds of rationality on the other hand, I'm not sure. I guess it largely depends on how we assess the relation between the two concepts: if they somehow overlap or if they have nothing in common. To me it seems implausible that they should have nothing in common.

I do like your idea about the "endarkenment" movement. Count me in as a member whenever you get the movement up and running! To veil the idea in order to make it visible: it is poetic language indeed, but is it then less "rational"? I should say not. Is it, because of it's apparent paradox, an unintelligible statement? No. Rather than being an unintelligible statement, it opens up a new world of questions and possibilities: what does the veil consist of, what made the idea invisible when there was no veil present, is truth the veil itself etc. I don't know if you have noticed it, but I use as a signature a quote from Adorno which says: "Retention of strangeness is the only antidote to estrangement." I find this to be a very similar sort of "conundrum". It makes us have another look at the concepts involved, it invites us reassess our understanding of the issue at hand and generally makes us more aware and alert.

To me this kind of approach makes much more sense than bringing "vague emotions" into the game. It solves nothing and just adds to the confusion that is already prevalent.

Retention of strangeness is the only antidote to estrangement. T. W. Adorno